• MAIN PAGE
  • LATEST NEWS
    • Lost Cities
    • Archaeology's Greatest Finds
    • Underwater Discoveries
    • Greatest Inventions
    • Studies
    • Blog
  • PHILOSOPHY
  • HISTORY
  • RELIGIONS
    • Africa
    • Anatolia
    • Arabian Peninsula
    • Balkan Region
    • China - East Asia
    • Europe
    • Eurasian Steppe
    • Levant
    • Mesopotamia
    • Oceania - SE Asia
    • Pre-Columbian Civilizations of America
    • Iranian Plateau - Central Asia
    • Indus Valley - South Asia
    • Japan
    • The Archaeologist Editor Group
    • Scientific Studies
    • Aegean Prehistory
    • Historical Period
    • Byzantine Middle Ages
    • Predynastic Period
    • Dynastic Period
    • Greco-Roman Egypt
  • Rome
  • PALEONTOLOGY
  • About us
Menu

The Archaeologist

  • MAIN PAGE
  • LATEST NEWS
  • DISCOVERIES
    • Lost Cities
    • Archaeology's Greatest Finds
    • Underwater Discoveries
    • Greatest Inventions
    • Studies
    • Blog
  • PHILOSOPHY
  • HISTORY
  • RELIGIONS
  • World Civilizations
    • Africa
    • Anatolia
    • Arabian Peninsula
    • Balkan Region
    • China - East Asia
    • Europe
    • Eurasian Steppe
    • Levant
    • Mesopotamia
    • Oceania - SE Asia
    • Pre-Columbian Civilizations of America
    • Iranian Plateau - Central Asia
    • Indus Valley - South Asia
    • Japan
    • The Archaeologist Editor Group
    • Scientific Studies
  • GREECE
    • Aegean Prehistory
    • Historical Period
    • Byzantine Middle Ages
  • Egypt
    • Predynastic Period
    • Dynastic Period
    • Greco-Roman Egypt
  • Rome
  • PALEONTOLOGY
  • About us

Homer's Enduring Influence: Prof. Paul Cartledge Discusses the Timeless Resurgence in Modern Media

May 3, 2024

An Interview with Prof. Paul Cartledge By Richard Marranca for The Archaeologist


The Humanities are being reduced in institutions, and yet there’s a burst, a renaissance, in Hollywood and in publishing: a movie in the works, The Return (based on The Iliad), starring Ralph Fiennes as Odysseus and Juliet Binoche as Penelope, and much else. And new translations of Homer. Can you share some thoughts on this? 

All human life—and, too often, death—is there in the monumental poems that we know as the Iliad and Odyssey. The latter takes its name from its eponymous hero; it’s all about Odysseus and his trials, travels, travails and tribulations. But the former poem should really be known as the Achilleid, since its theme is the rage of Greek superhero-demigod Achilles and its ultimate assuagement and abatement. We call them ‘epics’ , meaning something grand and monumental, but epos in ancient Greek meant simply ‘word’. Some word! All 27,000 or so lines between the two of them were composed orally and then much later put down in writing in a formal, hexameter metre and in a unique dialect never actually spoken by any Greeks outside of the context of a recital.

The poems are often said to be the ‘Bible’ of the ancient Greeks, but actually the (pagan, polytheistic) Greeks didn’t have any officially recognised sacred books. And although both poems are full of gods and goddesses and their interactions, both negative and positive, with humans, they are not teaching religious dogmas. What the ancient Greeks saw in the Iliad and Odyssey were rather models of mostly individual human behavior, both to imitate and to avoid, like the plague. The muthoi (traditional stories) they told remain rattling good yarns, hence the everflowing cascade of translations or versions in various languages (Emily Wilson’s not to my personal taste; see further below) and cinematic adaptations, whether on tv or in the movies (the 2003 Troy ditto). The humanities are generally under attack, yes, so there’s all the more need to defend and champion ‘Homer’!

What is the inciting incident of The Iliad? And, in a nutshell, what is the epic about?

In nuance, the theft of Helen, Queen of Sparta, by Trojan Prince Paris, a gross breach of hospitality etiquette as well as of sexual immorality, and its attempted rectification. A theft elaborately prepared by the mythic ‘backstory’ of Paris’s ‘judgment’: between the three mighty Greek goddesses Athena, Hera and sex-goddess Aphrodite, whom, naturally, the youthful Paris decides is ‘the fairest’. So it’s really Paris, not Helen who ‘causes’ the Trojan War, though later Greeks focused far more on hers than on Paris’s guilt.

Later Greeks—but not Homer, the Homer of the Iliad. He (?) plunges into the thick of it, many years later, almost ten years to be precise, after the seduction/abduction of Helen, since the action of the Iliad is confined to a few weeks, a couple of months, in the tenth year of a (historically impossible) ten-year siege. And Homer’s narrated action is focused all around Achilles and his piqued rage, which is directed chiefly at supreme Greek commander Agamemnon, King of Mycenae and brother of Helen’s cuckolded husband Menelaus.

And The Odyssey?

Discuss! As a historian specializing in early-historical Greece, I favour the view that, apart from all the excitements and sheer picaresque narrative thrills involving ogres and monsters of many kinds, it’s mainly all about Greekness or, to be more accurate linguistically, Hellenicity. (A sidebar: in Homer, Greeks are not called Hellenes but ‘Danaans’, ‘Argives’ or ‘Achaeans’.) How to be a Hellene in a world that was rapidly changing both geographically and culturally.

It’s always been a bit of a puzzle that the epic should focus on the ruler of a petty island-kingdom on the far west of mainland Greece, but I think the reason for that choice was mainly twofold: Ithaca was as far away from Troy while still being old-Greek as it was possible to get without leaving the mainland, and an ultimate western setting reflected the fact that from about the middle of the 8th century Greek traders, adventurers and settlers were moving west, some of them permanently, to south Italy and Sicily, passing by Ithaca en route.

How old were you when you first read the Iliad and Odyssey, and who were your teachers?

A. Believe it or not, I was 8 (1955). With some pocket money or birthday money, I bought and read both epics in a ‘told to the children’ format as rendered (in prose) by Jeannie Lang (daughter of Scottish poet, novelist, and literary critic Andrew) and illustrated by W. Heath Robinson (more famous as an inventor of fantastic imaginary machines). I still have the two books. Reading about the death of Argos the dog in the Odyssey reduced me to helpless tears for half an hour. 1955 was the same year I started learning Latin. I didn’t start to learn any form of ancient Greek until I was 11, and Homeric Greek not until many years later. I had no formal teachers of Homer that I can remember until I went to university, and even then I was mostly self-taught, using ‘Autenrieth’ (Georg Autenrieth, A Homeric Dictionary for Schools and Colleges, trans. 1891) pretty much as one would try to learn ancient Greek on one’s own by using a ‘Teach Yourself Ancient Greek’ guide.

How does one teach the Iliad or Odyssey? How might one do this for students who are new to the classics?

I myself cut my homeric teeth as an Oxford undergraduate in the late 1960s, choosing to take a special option course taught by the great H. F. ‘Dolly’ Gray. At the same time as I was learning via Homer much about Greek and Near Eastern archaeology of the late Bronze and early Iron Ages, I was also’mugging up’ translations of the entirety—all 24 books—of both the Iliad and Odyssey. I cranked my reading and translating speed up to 300 lines per hour, if I remember correctly, over 50 years later. I found the latter kind of (translation) exercise less pleasurable and rewarding than the former (archeohistorical). So, pedagogically, for adult anglophone consumers, I’d recommend reading first a good, poetic translation (Prof Wilson’s will serve, even if not ideal), then immersing oneself in the ‘world’ of Homer archaeologically, then and only then, having of course first learned the letters of the ancient Greek alphabet(s), sampling a passage or two from each poem in Greek.

What do you think of Prof. Emily Wilson’s recent translation of The Iliad?

I applaud her idea of making a poetic version in principle. But if her aim is to make Homer ‘accessible’ in an equivalent version in contemporary English, albeit in metre, that aim is somewhat misplaced, even misguided. As already noted, Homer’s language is a peculiar (that is, peculiar to the epic genre) idiolect, never spoken by ‘ordinary’ Greeks in ‘ordinary’, everyday discourse. So her version of the Iliad couldn’t possibly be in any sense close to the original. In choosing ‘blank’, unrhymed iambic pentameter, she seeks not unreasonably to allude to or appeal to the example of (some of) Shakespeare, who is often related analogically to Homer in virtue of their respective cultural authority. And just as Shakespeare’s verse was that of the late 16th and early 17th century, so Wilson’s is that of the early 21st.

But to my ear, too much of ''Wilson's'verse'—unlike that of, say, Robert Fagles, not to mention Shakespeare—is not so much genuine poetry as prose divided up to look on the page like lines of verse. A prime quality of the Homeric original is that it is essentially oral—that is, it was thought, composed and transmitted orally over hundreds of years, in an age of universal Greek illiteracy, before being written down in the brand-new alphabetic script invented in the 8th century BCE. Orality dictated the key feature of formulae used for repeated types of actions (e.g. arming scenes) or repeated personal epithets; these are not so hard to reproduce. Much harder is to capture the urgent immediacy of orality for a totally different modern audience—or rather, readership.

I recall that Professor Wilson said that one way she began translating The Odyssey was to begin playing around with the Cyclopes’ chapter, to get a feel for that through the vivid character, action, violence, etc.

Before Prof Wilson became the first woman to translate the Iliad into English, she had ‘done’ an excellent Odyssey, not the first by a woman, but it rightly received many plaudits. The subject-matter of that poem, so it seems to me, lends itself more to non-poetic exposition than does that of the Iliad. The Cyclopes episode, a sort of challenge match between the semi-divine monster Polyphemus and the all-too-human Odysseus, was an excellent choice of starting-point for Prof. Wilson for all those reasons (vivid character action, violence—often spine-tingling, even horrific). The episode has had multiple, often clashingly incongruous resonances in subsequent western literature and visual arts, as was brilliantly demonstrated by Mercedes Aguirre and Richard Buxton in their recent  Cyclops: The Myth and its Cultural History (Oxford U.P., 2020).

I recall that in The Odyssey, she didn’t use the term “whores” for the women who had sex with the Suitors; she used the term “slaves.” That’s a big difference, isn’t it?

A. Yes, and no! In the ancient Greek (and Roman) world, many sex-workers were enslaved persons, so for females, the two terms ‘whores’ and ‘slaves’ would regularly have been semantically congruent. The poet or poets of the Odyssey made it abundantly clear that the female royal-household servants of Penelope and her son Telemachus were unfree and belonged to them, that is, were slaves. That they could also be regarded as ‘whores’ derived from the fact that they slept with—or were required to sleep with—some or all of the 108 suitors competing for the hand (and more) of the supposed widow of Odysseus, young men whose general lack of social finesse encompassed that particular mode of abusive sexual behaviour.

Professor Wilson’s Iliad begins thus: “Goddess, sing of the cataclysmic wrath of great Achilles, son of Peleus…”And The Odyssey: “Tell me about a complicated man.”

A. To my ear, ‘complicated’ is both somewhat bathetic, for the opening line of an epic, and somewhat anachronistic. The Homeric Greek epithet polutropos means literally ‘much-turning’ or ‘of many turns’, which can be interpreted rather flatly, as is done by Prof Wilson, or be given a knowing spin as in ‘of many wiles’, for Odysseus is above all—or much—else wily. ‘Cataclysmic’ is a great epithet, also knowing since Achilles’s rage or wrath will cause cataclysmic, though not always fatal, damage both to personal relationships among Greeks and to the Greeks’ supposed cause. But it’s not actually there in Homer’s Greek, so it’s translator’s license.

In the Translator’s Note to The Iliad, Professor Wilson writes: “Human mortality is at the center of it all.” The Iliad is about many things, such as families, the hero, war, fate, the gods, Achilles’ anger and so on, but is mortality the umbrella or DNA of the epic? 

This is surely correct: the humanities are by definition concerned with humankind’s life-chances and life-fates, and mortality captures humanness from one essential viewpoint: we humans all inevitably die. For the ancient Greeks, the gods and goddesses were precisely the not-mortals, a-thanatoi. Mortality is there in both poems: hundreds of Greeks and Trojans die in the Iliad, and all Odysseus’ men are gone before the hero regains Ithaca. But it is not the umbrella concept of either poem, though it is far more so in the Iliad than in the Odyssey. Odysseus, after all, lives literally to tell his tale—or (often tall) tales. As for Achilles, he is still very much alive and kicking at the end of the Iliad; his death will not be related until later, in a poem of the so-called Epic Cycle.

In Greece's Historical Period Tags Richard Marranca

Exploring the Roots of Democracy: An Exclusive Interview with Prof. Paul Cartledge on Ancient Greek Political Directions

April 19, 2024

Directions in Democracy: Interview with Prof. Paul Cartledge. Richard Marranca for The Archaeologist


Q1. Can you define the word “democracy”? Where did it begin (and end) and how far did it spread?

A. Etymologically, the ancient Greek coinage dêmokratia (first attested c. 425 BC/E) combined dêmos and kratos. The meaning of kratos is unambiguous: power or might. The meaning of dêmos, however, is ambiguous: either ‘people’ (the people as a whole, the city or state, e.g., Athens) or the majority of the empowered (adult male citizen) people, a.k.a. the masses or (if you didn’t like them) the mob or rabble. So, ancient Greek dêmokratia could mean either ‘the power of the people’ (as in Lincoln’s ‘government of the people by the people for the people’) or the power of the masses (over both the organs of state governance and over the elite few citizens). If you were a member of the elite Few rich citizens, you might well prefer oligarchy (rule of the elite Few) to democracy, which you might see as merely mobocracy or mob-rule (further below, Q5).

Origins and spread: Some scholars have sought to identify ‘democratic’ or ‘proto-democratic’ institutions in other times and places and cultures (see further below, towards the end of this interview), but if what is taken to matter most is the power of decision-making and, as part of that, the power to call executive office-holders to account by judicial or other means, then the first democracy properly so called anywhere in the world was that of Athens, brought into being in stages during the approximately half-century between c. 508/7 and 462/1 BC/E. There were some 1000 separate political entities in Hellas (the Greek world) between about 500 and 300 BC/E; of those, perhaps a quarter, perhaps as many as half at one time or another within those two centuries experienced some form of democracy (Aristotle in his Politics treatise of c. 330 identified four main types); but pioneering Athens (which experienced three or four forms over time) was the most consistently and extensively democratic of all.

The Roman conquest of Greece in the last two centuries BC/E put an end to all forms of ancient Greek (direct) democracy. The recuperation and revival of (indirect, representative) democracy began in the 17th century in England, spread from there to the United States and France in the 18th, and more widely in the world from the end of the 19th. Full adult (women as well as men) suffrage democracy was an achievement of the 20th century. The ‘largest’ existent democracy (since 1947) is India. But all modern democracies (especially those that are democracies merely in name, e.g., the People’s Democracy of China) are representative, not direct: it is representatives (however selected, whether nominated or elected) who actually govern and rule on a day-to-day basis, not ‘the people’ (however defined) as such.

Q2. According to your brilliant, wide-ranging study, Democracy: a Life (O.U.P., NY & Oxford, new edition 2018), there are solid reasons for the invention of democracy. Can you situate us back then to show what inventions and trends in Greece, and specifically in Athenian society, led to democracy?

A. This is an exceptionally tough ask! Preconditions of what I take to be the origins of democracy at Athens (see below on Solon v. Cleisthenes) include: invention c. 700 BC/E of the polis (city-state, citizen-state), a rule-bound political entity based on a definition of the privileges and duties of citizens (always free adult males); weakening of the original rule over poleis by exclusive aristocracies (literally ‘the power of the best’, in fact of the richest and most noble families) through such factors as intermarriage between noble and non-noble families, the impoverishment of some aristocrats, and the rise of new-wealthy families due to for example success in overseas trade; the shift from long-range fighting conducted only by the most wealthy to the dominant role of infantry phalanx fighting undertaken by more middling-rich heavy-armed soldiers; and the emergence in some of the larger, more important poleis(Athens was one) of sole-ruler autocrats called ‘tyrants’ who found it helpful to dispossess or weaken the older ruling families by spreading political power more widely down to poorer, commoner citizens.

Q3. What about Greek religion, oracles and such? How was that part of the conversation on democracy? And how about science and democracy?

A. Religion, oracles, etc. Religion was never seen as a distinct sphere, separate from a secular sphere, so democratic politics was always heavily invested in and inflected by religion. Yet the Greeks had no single word for ‘religion’, but used periphrases such as ‘the things of the gods’, ‘gods’ being understood as a plural, polytheistic term embracing both gods and goddesses. The overriding goal of human relations with the divine pantheon was to keep the most relevant gods and goddesses happy, to maintain the ‘peace’ of the gods, by duly ‘acknowledging’ them through animal blood-sacrifices, prayers, festivals, etc. The democratic Athenians between them devoted more days of the year to festivals of the various divinities than did any other Greek city. All such Athenian festivals, whether national or local, were managed democratically. Likewise, all matters of religion, including oracles,. There were many Greek oracular shrines scattered throughout the Greek world (in Asia and Africa as well as Europe), but the most famous was that of Apollo at Delphi in central mainland Greece. Consultations here, both personal and state, began in the 8th century BC/E. One of the most famous episodes of the Athenian official state consultation of the Delphic Oracle occurred under the democracy in the 480s BC/E in anxious preparation to face a massive impending invasion by the empire of Persia. The Delphic priestess gave conflicting responses to different consultations, so it fell to the Assembly of the Athenians to decide which interpretation to favour and act upon. Happily, they chose correctly, built a large fleet of trireme warships, and Athens emerged victorious from the Persian Wars—and with its still-evolving democracy intact.

Science: Around 600 BCE, there emerged a tendency for a very small elite group of Greek intellectuals on both sides of the Aegean Sea to question the inherited religious worldview in favour of a more scientific, mechanistic understanding of the cosmos, how it came into being, and what it was composed of.  But it took a very long time before the role of gods and goddesses in making and determining the nature of the world was seriously challenged by any large number of citizens. The earliest thoroughgoing Greek atheists are not attested until towards the end of the 5th century BC/E, well after the introduction of democratic systems of government.

Q4. In order to understand Athenian democracy, is Solon or Cleisthenes a good starting point? Who are the major Democrats? And what were the major institutions of democracy?

A. Solon or Cleisthenes? Greeks liked the idea of ‘founding fathers’, people they called ‘legislators’ or ‘lawgivers’ and to whom they sometimes actually paid religious worship as ‘heroes’ after their deaths. The earliest of them belonged to what we call the 7th century BC/E, but some of them (e.g., Lycurgus of Sparta) were more mythical than historical. The Athenians had two rival ‘Founders’ of their democracy: the more conservative citizens looked back to Solon (c. 600 BC/E), the more radical to Cleisthenes (c. 500 BC/E). Both men belonged by wealth, family, and upbringing to the elite few, but both, like Pericles most famously later on (c. 450 BC/E), believed in giving power to the ‘People’. The question is: what kind of power, how much, and to which people? Most scholars now agree that Cleisthenes was the true founder of classical Athenian democracy. The reforms that went under his name in 508/7 included a redefinition of citizenship itself, a recalibration of relations between the central organs of governance and the local constituencies, the invention of a new council to serve as the standing committee for the Assembly, and a reorganisation of the regionally recruited and arrayed hoplite land army. Further reforms were introduced in a package proposed by Ephialtes with the support of Pericles in 462/1. But Ephialtes was murdered shortly after, in a contract killing, and rather unfairly, his name was never added to the list of ‘legislator’ founders.

Major Democrats: very few surviving writers were ideological Democrats (see further below), and none of the leading democratic politicians of Athens apart from Demosthenes (below) has left us any written works on the theme. The four most prolific extant authors on classical Greek democracy—the Athenian aristocrat Plato (c. 428–347) and his most famous pupil, originally northern Greek Aristotle (384–322), son of a royal physician; and the Athenian pamphleteers Isocrates (436-338) and Xenophon (c. 428–354)—were all non-democrats, though of these, Plato was by far the most hostile to democracy, which he saw as the rule of the ignorant, fickle, unenlightened majority over the educated, intelligent minority. Outside Athens, several tens of other Greek cities were at one time or another more or less democratic, e.g., Thebes in the 4th century BC/E, but, as at Athens, no leading democratic statesman (e.g., Epaminondas of Thebes) has left us any writings. Apart from Pericles (below) and Demosthenes, the leading Athenian democrats of different stripes included: Cleisthenes (c. 570–500), retrospectively credited as the founder of Athenian democracy as such, though he was by birth an aristocrat with a foreign (Sicyonian) mother; Cleon (??–422), the principal successor to Pericles as the most influential war politician of the 420s; and Aeschines (389–314), who lost out to Demosthenes on the major issue of resistance to the rise of the (non- and anti-democratic) kingdom of Macedon.

Institutions.

Local: At base were the 139 or 140 Attic (Athenian) demes: in order to be an active, empowered (free adult male) citizen, one had to be officially enrolled at the age of 18 on the register of the deme of one’s (citizen) father. One’s father or nearest relative swore that the 18-year-old was who he said he was and who his father was, and that his parents had been legally married when they produced him. Demes held assembly meetings, celebrated festivals, and managed military call-ups.

National/Central: The ultimate decision-making body was the ‘demos of the Athenians’, meeting regularly (at first once a month, eventually four times every 35 or 36 days) in Assembly to decide on matters put to them by a steering committee known as the Council (Boulê), a body of 500 citizens aged over 30 chosen by lot on a deme-quota basis, which was in almost permanent session throughout the civil year. Councillors counted as ‘officials’, of which there were altogether some 700 domestic and (during the last seven decades of the 5th century) a further 700 holding office abroad in what we call an Athenian ‘empire’ (though it wasn’t anything like the Persian, Roman, or British). Most officials were, like the 500 Councillors, selected by lot; only the top three executive offices, the Generals, Treasurers of Athena (Athens’s patron deity), and (in the 5th century only) the ‘Treasurers of the Greeks’, and one or two other officials (e.g., in the 4th century, the Water Commissioner), were chosen by election—partially because of the need for expertise and partly so that, if they failed or committed crimes in office, they could be brought to account through heavy fining—or worse (up to and including execution). Generals and Treasurers served on boards of 10, and almost all boards were appointed and reappointed annually. Elections were considered undemocratic or anti-democratic since they favoured notabilities, whereas the random lot encouraged, recognized, and favoured the essential contributions of ordinary citizens.

Q5. What about Greeks who didn’t like democracy? Did they see it as a precarious mob rule?

A. They did. They coined a special word, ochlokratia, meaning the power of the ochlos, or mob. An elite writer such as the historian Thucydides spoke scornfully of the ‘naval mob’, meaning that most of the Athenian citizen sailors who rowed the warfleets that were the basis of Athenian external power in the 5th century were drawn from the lower socioeconomic orders, the masses. Some fanatical Greek ultra-oligarchs, as reported by Aristotle (who was himself a moderate oligarch), even took a religious oath that they would do as much damage and harm as they possibly could to the hated poor masses of citizens! By that, they meant not only keeping them out of power by monopolising offices themselves and by making and enforcing other anti-democratic laws, but also using their monopoly power to exploit the masses economically through rack rent or other forms of debt.

Q6. You write about how Athens and its allies promoted democracy and how other powers (Sparta, Philip, Alexander, and Rome) didn’t. Were there common methods used to crush democracy?

A. It’s difficult to generalize. One of Thucydides’s major themes is stasis: civil strife (usually economic, often ideological) or outright civil war. He takes as his paradigmatic instance the outbreak on the island of Corfu (in ancient Greek, Kerkura) in 427 BC/E, in which the Athenians militarily supported the democrats and the Spartans the oligarchs. It was paradigmatic because, he says, from 427 on, stasis broke out ever more frequently throughout the Greek world, and the two great powers of the day, Athens and Sparta—who were also at the time warring enemies—would use their interventions on behalf of democrats and oligarchs in different cities as a technique of both imperial expansion and military engagement. The two typical demands of Democrats in oligarchically run cities give a clue as to the nature of the economic basis of stasis: ‘cancel debts’ (often agricultural loans or town rents) and’redistribute the land’. Most Greek cities and states were fundamentally agrarian, and the source of most oligarchs’ wealth, apart from trade, was agricultural landownership and surpluses of staple crops (cereals, olives, and wine grapes—produced for them by slaves or tenants). Oligarchs reinforced their economic superiority by making moral-cultural claims, saying that only they were the ‘good’ or ‘best’ citizens, whereas the poor Democrats were the ‘bad’ or ‘worst’.

Q7. Along with the political champions of democracy, who were the historians and authors who were on the side of democracy?

A. There were very, very few such champions! Of the historians, I’d single out Herodotus (c. 484–425), who, arguably, was a moderate democrat. When trying to explain the democratic Athenians’ unexpected victory over the Persians at the battle of Marathon in 490 BC/E, he put it down to their fundamental notion of citizen equality. (The other core concept of democracy was freedom—both freedom from and freedom to.) But even Herodotus reported scornfully that the Athenian democracy could make stupid collective decisions. Among other kinds of authors, the most prominent democrat on record is Demosthenes (384–322), super-wealthy like Pericles. His democratic views were expressed in the published versions of speeches he had delivered without a text in the Athenian Assembly meetings (held on the Pnyx hill), usually on matters of foreign policy, so that he would often contrast the (superior) Athenian democrats and democracy with their non-democratic Spartan opponents. But that didn’t stop him from also blaming the citizens of the Athenian democracy, either for being more interested in hearing speeches than taking appropriate action or (in the case of the richer citizens) failing to pay their taxes.

Q8. Was Aristotle for a mixed constitution and governing system? Is that the same kind of path as modern democracies? Is this similar to the balance of powers idea in the modern world?

A. Yes, Aristotle was for a mixed constitutional and governmental system, which he saw as a compromise between giving exclusive or preponderant power to either the rich Few or the poor Many citizens. It is and it isn’t similar to our ‘balance of powers’ notion. Similar, because it includes the idea of checks and balances between the two salient groups. Not similar, because our notion of a balance of powers depends on the prior notion of a separation of the powers of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. ancient Greeks did not hold that notion; they believed that political power-holders should exercise power in all three spheres alike, even to the point of acting in one sphere (judicial) to revise or counteract a decision they themselves had taken in another (legislative). An ancient Greek polity was seen as a strong community—strong but therefore all the more worth fighting for control over! Hence stasis; see above.

 

Q9. It was great the way you explained Pericles and the (5th-century) Golden Age (as well as Alexander the Great) on BBC’s In Our Time and in your books. Can you tell us about Pericles, his famous speeches, and his great role as a leader and promoter of democracy? Who advised him? What were his failings?

A. That’s a huge question, big enough for a whole book—there have been several life-and-times modern biographies of Pericles (c. 492-429), and I’m contemplating writing another soon! Our main surviving source is a life written by the famous Boeotian biographer Plutarch (c. 100 CE), and he had available to him many written texts that have since been lost. But he wasn’t a historian (he was mainly interested in moral character), and he didn’t know what to do with what seemed a contradiction to him, living as he did in a non- or anti-democratic age under the Roman Empire. The contradiction was that Pericles seemed to him to be, on the one hand, a true statesman who rose above sordid personal and ideological politics to act impartially for the good of the Athenians as a whole, but yet, on the other hand, just another political operator keen to achieve and maintain personal power by any means possible!

The answer to the apparent contradiction is that Pericles was probably quite a lot of both. The chief piece of evidence for his views on democracy as a governmental system and way of life is a speech that historian Thucydides wrote, based no doubt on what Pericles had actually said in a civic funeral oration in 431/0, but expressed according to Thucydides’ memory and in Thucydides’s own style of Athenian Greek. Since Thucydides was not himself a democrat (he was a somewhat moderate oligarch), it is thought that that explains why Pericles’ views expressed here are less than radically egalitarian and democratic. Pericles had a small coterie of intellectual advisers with whom he discussed and initiated policy. He regularly spoke persuasively in the Assembly before audiences of upwards of 5000 or 6,000 in the open air. But he was also a tireless backroom technocrat, particularly good at public finance, including helping to manage the public, religio-political (re)building programme on the Acropolis that produced the Parthenon temple. His one big failing was to overestimate the reserves and other resources Athens had at its disposal in 431 in order to resist the onslaught from Sparta and to underestimate the effect on morale that his strategy of mostly passive resistance would have on his people. He couldn't, of course, be blamed for failing to predict the Great Plague of Athens (from which he himself died, as did his two sons), but his policy and strategy did make the funereal effects of it much worse.

 

Q10. Did the Roman Republic (or other ancient societies) have any inkling of democracy? How about tribal or pre-political cultures? Do tribes have informal practices that can be identified as democratic?

It’s vital to distinguish between the supremely political Roman Republic and cultures that may be labelled ‘tribal’ but are certainly in key respects pre-political. This is a distinction that those who wish to assign the term ’democracy’ even to such pre-political societies, notably in Asia and Africa, fail to observe. For example, ‘primitive’ democracies have been identified in 3rd millennium BC/E Assyria or ‘traditional’ (pre-colonial) India, but in all such cases, not only is politics properly so-called absent, but the most that is permitted to ordinary ‘people’ (not of course citizens) below the (usually hereditary) tribal chief or dynastic monarch is some form or degree of ‘discussion’, but nothing approaching collective, popular decision-making power.

The Roman Republic is a special case—and a special problem—from the point of view of democracy. Its very name means, literally, the ‘popular thing’ or the ‘thing of the people’, and formally speaking, absolutely every public political decision, whether taken by vote in one other legislative or electoral assembly or in a ‘People’s’ lawcourt, was a decision of the Roman people. However, here we would do well to remember Lincoln at Gettysburg, quoted above: was the government of the U.S. ‘people’ in 1863 really, in any useful sense, democratic? The great historian Polybius, a conservative, oligarchic Greek of the 2nd century BC/E who was so much an admirer of the Roman governmental system that he attributed to it the source of Rome’s external power and empire, something of which he approved, thought that he could see a strong democratic element or elements in the Roman system, but even he categorised it overall not as a democracy but as a’mixed constitution’, the democratic elements being counterbalanced and outweighed by the oligarchic and the monarchic or residually regal. We, however, might better take our cue from another historian of Rome, the great Tacitus (c. 55–120 CE), who wrote that’mixed’ constitutions existed only in speculative theory and not in hard, material practice. For in reality, the Roman Republic was a traditional, aristocratically inflected oligarchy of wealth, in which there were no one-man, one-vote legislative, policymaking, or electoral assemblies, but state policy was determined by a handful of senior elected executives within the aristocratic-oligarchic Senate, literally a body of ‘Elders’ but actually composed of nobles and notables aged over 30, and delivered by a small body of all-powerful, non-responsible’magistrates’.

 

Q11. Was democracy too quixotic or odd for societies—from Imperial Rome to the 1600s or so—to bother with it? Was the subject too hot to handle?

A. Not, I think, too quixotic (though both Republican and Imperial Rome produced relatively few speculative, utopian political thinkers, as opposed to Cicero, the classic prophet-of-things-as-they-are, steady-state, reactionary oligarchic thinker), but, yes, too hot. Rome as an imperial power, first in Italy then throughout the Mediterranean and beyond, always followed the lead of Sparta, systematically favouring, to the extent of radically intervening militarily to impose, oligarchies of conservative, propertied aristocrats or semi-aristocrats among their subordinate ‘allies’. Imperial Rome from Augustus (27 BC/E-14 CE) on was of course an autocracy or dictatorship, no matter how hard at least the earliest Emperors tried to disguise it as a (restored) republic. For the nature of the Republic as a political system, see immediately above.

Q12. I recall a lot in your book about the Magna Carta, Machiavelli, Cromwell, Hobbes, Rousseau, Tocqueville, and more. Can you comment on some of the important aspects and people?

A. The reasons for which the object and persons you mention are included in my book vary greatly! Broadly speaking, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Tocqueville may be invoked as democratic or proto-democratic, whereas Cromwell and Hobbes belong firmly to the anti-democratic tradition. In more detail, the Florentine Machiavelli (1469–1527), author of The Prince, was heir to a medieval Italian tradition of city-republics in which a political place was reserved for some construction of il popolo (‘the People’), but the very title of his most famous work tells us that in practice, the most he could have been hoping to achieve was moderate autocracy or dictatorship inflected in a vaguely populist direction. J-J Rousseau (1712–1778), a Swiss-French philosopher and educator, first formulated the notion of the ‘general will’, a far more democratic notion than, say, Cicero’s ‘will of the populus’. He was considered, together with Voltaire, one of the two greatest intellectual influences on the French Revolution (which had a democratic element). Alexis, count of Tocqueville (1805–1859), was the author of a brilliant, officially commissioned study that he entitled Démocratie en Amérique (1839–40). The word ‘democracy’ in its French form had been borrowed into anglophone discourse; Tocqueville repaid the compliment by emphasising the egalitarian, democratic spirit of (settler, colonial) Americans a score of years before Lincoln became the first US President to be elected, in 1860, on an explicitly anti-slaveowning ticket.

Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) was, of course, by definition, a small republican, since he led the movement of regicide that executed King Charles I in 1649. But as Lord Protector under the shortlived English Republic (1649–1660), he showed definite authoritarian, undemocratic, and even regal tendencies. Three authors of the Republican period exemplify the fierce ideological debates that caused and were caused by the act of regicide: the poet John Milton (1608-1674) and the political theorist James Harrington (1611-1677) were both for the Republic and showed proto-democratic leanings, whereas Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), a political philosopher, was all for the re-establishment of an all-controlling sole rule and blamed the ancient Greeks (some of them!) for being all too peskily democratic.

Magna Carta (1215 CE, sworn between King John of England and a select group of Barons) is ambiguous: a couple of its clauses, most famously the one prescribing habeas corpus, can be seen as folding without friction into more genuinely democratic regimes such as that (‘constitutional monarchy’) established by the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688/9, but in origin and intent there is nothing democratic whatsoever about Magna Carta as such.

Q13. There is little direct democracy in Western countries, though there are many representative democracies and republics. Can you explain that?

A. The issue is tripartite: size, ideology, and technology. In the ancient Greek world, which was endowed with communications technology at a distance, democracy had to be direct. But that technological necessity was reinforced by ideology: it was believed that the people as such ought to or had to govern, both as themselves and for themselves, for a set purpose. And the combination of low technology with a belief in the virtue of direct rule was further reinforced by the very small size of ancient citizen bodies, the modal size of which is estimated to be between 500 and 2000 adult males. The ancient Athenian democratic citizen body, normally around 30,000 but sometimes increasing up to 50 or 60,000 and sometimes decreasing to 20,000 or below, was altogether exceptional, off the scale. But a normal figure for the attendance at a regular Athenian democratic assembly meeting on the Pnyx hill is thought to have been a more manageable 5 or 6,000, with 6,000 being set as the minimum required, the quorum, for valid voting on certain issues, such as the award of citizenship to a non-Athenian foreigner. Whoever/however many turned up at an Assembly meeting or at an electoral meeting were officially deemed to be ‘the people’ for legal-constitutional purposes. Likewise, any ‘People’s’ jury, selected by lot from a panel of 6,000, whether 201 or 2,501; a usual figure (as at the trial of Socrates) was 501, the large size aimed at preventing effective bribery. The Athenians were therefore perfectly able to incorporate the idea of representation into their fundamentally and definitionally direct system of democracy.

Direct democracy within the basically representative systems of contemporary (Western) democracy is understandably very rare, given all the fundamental ways—size, technology, and ideology—in which contemporary democracies differ from those of ancient Greece. There is, however, one mode of democratic political action that, as used in some modern democracies and in some (e.g., Switzerland) much more frequently than others, approximates more nearly the ancient Greeks’ direct ways of reaching political decisions, and that is the use of the plebiscite or referendum. Significantly, both of those terms have a Latin, not a Greek, etymology, since far more contemporary European and Euro-American civil and criminal law is derived from Roman than from ancient Greek law. Different democratic countries have different rules for how, on what issues, or in what form a referendum may be couched, held, and evaluated in the overall process of governance. Radical Democrats today argue that direct democracy—or elements of direct democracy—should be enhanced, for example, by incorporating it into the very lawmaking process itself. But few if any argue that a modern democracy, one in possession of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, for instance, should take advantage of the latest digital communications technology to introduce direct self-government by referendum on a daily basis.

Q14: Is there an inherent contradiction? Like this: cities and civilization created democracy. But this produces extremely powerful individuals and groups—hierarchies. What do you think?

A. Only indirectly did cities and civilization (the latter derived etymologically from the former) produce/create democracy. It is true, however, that democracy was/is a culture, a way of life, not just a system of governmental organization and popular decision-making. For instance, humans in ‘nature’ aren’t all equal, so to make equality a fundamental core democratic value is to act culturally, not naturally. Institutions, of course, take time to establish and have to be forged and tested to destruction. Humans are social beings, but they require conscious acculturation to dominant shared values. Democracy is not the work of a day. On hierarchy, see answers to Q15 and 18.

Q15. Most, if not all, organizations have one leader or an oligarchy. Would that be the case for corporations and universities too, and so on?

A. In the early 20th century, German sociologist Robert Michels promulgated his ‘Iron Law’ of oligarchy, to the effect that, no matter how democratic any large organization—or society!—might intend and proclaim itself to be, actually in time it would in practice be run oligarchically, that is, by a small group of people effectively beyond the reach and control of the ‘ordinary’ members of the organization (whether a business corporation or a university). Specialists in the history of the ancient Athenian democracy have argued vigorously—and I believe successfully—against applying any such ‘iron law’ to Athenian politics between about 500 and 320 BC/E, but they are happy to claim (and again, I agree with them) that the ‘Law’ does apply to the Roman Republic. As for modern organizations and societies, I’d say that a weak version of Michels’s Law—a lead rather than iron law, perhaps—does generally apply universally, though in some cases (Xi Jin Ping’s China, e.g.) more obviously than in others.

Q16: Is direct democracy slow and inefficient for organizations? Is it also the case that the rich and powerful (or anyone) just prefer a steady state or enlargement of their position?

Q17. One thing I’ve noticed is that powerful people on the Left make all sorts of lovely ideal announcements, but that much of it doesn’t stand for themselves but for society or “the masses” out there. Like celebrities with their private jets. Or in the USA, people who tout the equality of public schools or busing their kids to more diverse schools or affirmative action—but don’t have that for their kids, of course.

A. I think those two questions/observations can usefully be answered together. It all depends on what you mean by ‘efficiency’, and whether you’re thinking only in terms of values that can be measured quantitatively or/and of issues that can and should be evaluated qualitatively. Aristotle was surely right to give an essentially economic, class-based analysis of how power was distributed and exercised in the Greek political communities and societies he knew. I would add that that analysis can also usefully be applied universally, mutatis mutandis. On the side of values, the Funeral Speech attributed by Thucydides to Pericles (see above) contains one remarkable passage on shirkers, or what we call free riders. Such people, who fail to make their proper civic contribution to the common good, have, Pericles says, no place in democratic Athens. Again, I would suggest that that argument doesn’t apply only to an ancient democracy.

Q18. Our cousins on the evolutionary scale are prone to having alpha males; chimpanzee colonies have male leaders that rule over everyone and rule by might.Is the hierarchical nature of things (as a researcher such as Jane Goodall might say) just built into human &comparable non-human animal social life?

Sociobiologists (such as the late E.O. Wilson) and ethologists would say yes, certain tendencies—such as the aggressive struggle for alpha status—are hardwired into, say, chimpanzee colonies and, insofar as humans are evolutionarily the direct descendants of such primates, into human ‘colonies’ (polities, societies) too. Against which I, as a historian, would urge the claims of ‘culture’ or ‘nurture’ as being comparable or even superior to those of ‘nature’, from two main points of view, one ancient, one modern. From the ancient point of view, I would call in evidence again Herodotus and his pioneering histories. Running like a red thread throughout is the interpretive notion that humans, when organized politically, make strikingly different political choices, often overdetermined by considerations such as religion or warmaking. Some go for imperial autocracy (the Persians), others for democracy (some Greeks). Yet evolutionarily speaking, they were all much the same as human social beings. Likewise in modernity: in 1934, brilliant US social anthropologist and ethnographer Ruth Benedict published her Patterns of Culture, in which she examined closely three ‘cultures’ widely scattered in space and therefore unable to interact with or upon each other. Her point was: My, how different! All three were human cultures, but their underlying norms and beliefs and their attitudes and social practices were so utterly different from each other.

Q19. You mentioned digital democracy on p. 310. What are the five major qualities of democracy?

A. I’m not sure that ‘digital’ is what I would have thought of first when thinking about democracy’s major qualities, partly because digital technology is an enabling and not intrinsically a determining factor, and partly because some of the consequences of the digital revolution have been, in my view, dire for my understanding of what democracy is or could best be. Ironically, ancient Athenian democracy was also digital: votes in assembly were taken by raising the right hand, and in the lawcourts, jurors scratched on wax tablets—a longer line for the heavier penalty, a shorter line for the lighter penalty.

Five major qualities (which all have to be interpreted, cashed out, and finessed): equality (especially of respect, and of opportunity); freedom (from slavery or other external force, and freedom to participate); what’s been known – since Aristotle – as the ‘wisdom of crowds’ (some people are smarter, more committed, more persuasive etc etc than others, but – throw as many persons’ opinions as possible into the mix and the resulting compromise agreement is likely to be as good or a better decision than one achieved by just one or a few persons); democracy of necessity uniquely fosters the four cardinal virtues both individually and more especially collectively (prudence, justice, courage/fortitude, and temperance/self-control); finally, negatively, as Prime Minister Churchill memorably put it, democracy is the least worst system of governance out of all those that have so far been tried!

Q20. Lately with students I’ve been discussing literature / culture from the 1920s, Fitzgerald’s Great Gatsby, Hemingway stories, the Harlem Renaissance… We were talking about how our era shares a lot of scary stuff from the 1920s -- the rise of fascism and nationalism,militarism, economic problems, and more? Lenin started the idea of the one-party vanguard state, and although he considered that to be a form of democracy, it was anything but liberal. The governments of China and Russia and others today hate any form of, and especially liberal Western-style, democracy. How fragile are our Western democracies? Is this authoritarian or fascist streak gaining ground around the world?  

A. Very fragile, and yes, they are increasingly under threat globally, both externally and sadly, internally, from authoritarian or neofascist regimes. If I may, I would like to bring the debate much closer to home—that is, your home in the USA and mine in the UK. Was (ex-President) Donald Trump behind the January 6, 2021, insurrection and assault on the Capitol?The jury is still officially out, but the evidence is increasingly conclusive that he was. Likewise, there is surely little doubt that his other legal attempts to reverse the actual popular vote of November 2020 were similarly motivated, namely by a fierce desire not to surrender the exceptional powers entrusted to a US President in office and, above all, not to make himself vulnerable to due legal retribution for any crimes or misdemeanours he may have committed in or when seeking office. On my side of the pond, if on a far smaller scale, ex-Prime Minister Boris Johnson (trained as a classicalist) was the first PM in UK history to have been found guilty of a criminal offence and fined for it. But it is rather his reckless desire to ride roughshod over longstanding parliamentary conventions as well as over formal legal constitutional rules that concerned and still concerns me most as a Democrat. In both those individual cases, the norms, rules, and laws of democracy as currently framed seem to have triumphed. But for the future...

Q21. What about the misnamed countries with democracy in the title but which are totalitarian states? Or the democracies with antidemocratic qualities? It’s confusing out there! Can you comment on this?

A. The ‘People’s Democracies’ usually are or were not at all democratic: the People’s Republic of (Communist) China or the late and unlamented GDR (German Democratic Republic a.k.a. ‘East Germany’ – 1949–91) are classic cases. And those two are or were undemocratic for the same reason: ‘the People’ has been substituted politically by the (vanguard) Party, members of which are nominated and self-appointed and not responsible or accountable to the (real) People. To call the system ‘totalitarian’ is a rather more tricky issue conceptually, however, since the word implies that every political decision affecting individual and collective prosperity is taken centrally, hierarchically, and unidirectionally. Not even ‘absolute’ monarchs, however, actually wielded absolute power.

Q22. Overpopulation, climate change, the rise of technology, wealth inequality around the world, entertainment culture, and so on and so forth—what of those is a danger to democracy?

A. All of the above! But not only to democracy and democracies, of course. Climate change threatens us all alike with extinction. If by ‘entertainment culture’ is meant or included’social media’, then, alas, yes, the promised egalitarian and educational benefits of the online world have been overbalanced by fiercely regressive, antidemocratic exploitation.

Q23. What can each of us do to promote democracy, whether representative or direct?

A. Oscar Wilde, an Anglo-Irish writer, critic, and political activist (also classically educated), once observed that the trouble with socialism was that it took too many free evenings. Ditto democracy, or, at any rate, democratic activism. Since party politics seems to be here to stay for as long as representative democracy does, active membership in the local branch of a national political party is one obvious way to promote it. Another, purely modern way is to start and promote an online campaign, either as an individual or as hosted by an activist organization such as (in the UK) the New Citizenship Project. If by chance one’s campaign gains tens of thousands of supporters, even over 100,000, the UK government is obliged to hold an open debate on the topic, which might be a cultural-political issue such as the reunification back in Athens of all the Parthenon Marbles currently held outside (e.g., in the British Museum) or a definitionally political issue such as Brexit.

Q24. Do you have any favorite films, books, organizations, or people that promote direct democracy / democracy in general?

A. If I may interpret your question loosely: Aristophanes’s comedy Wasps (422 BC/E) is a brilliant satire on the workings of Athenian democratic justice, but its underlying message is that doing public-political community service as a juror was of the essence of being a democrat. If it’s the culture of modern democracy, its egalitarian spirit, that one is looking for, then US poet Walt (‘Leaves of Grass’) Whitman (1819–1892) and his Democratic Vistas (1871) are your men. Still, alas, of our own time and for our own time are George Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945) and 1984 (1949), which magnificently, terrifyingly, bear out Churchill’s ‘least worst’ dictum quoted above.

Q25. The future. It’s hard to see anything positive in most sci-fi literature and movies. Governments imagined there are often totalitarian and oligarchic. Do artists serve as radar—feeling and seeing something dreadful ahead? Are they warning us?

A. Apologies, but I must recuse myself here. My experience of sci-fi in any form is nugatory. But to use another analogy, independent, creative artists in all media may be likened to the topmost branches of a tree, which, in a storm, are the first to shake, bend, and even possibly break, giving advance notice of even greater change and either renewal or destruction to come down below.

In Greece's Historical Period Tags Richard Marranca

Ancient Wisdom for the Modern World: Insights from Greek Philosophy with Dr. Cartledge

February 2, 2024

By Richard Marranca


Toolbox of Greek Philosophy: A Conversation with Dr. Paul Cartledge" by Richard Marranca is an in-depth interview exploring various facets of ancient Greek philosophy, including the ideas of the Presocratics, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and others. It delves into themes like the essence and impact of early Greek philosophical thoughts, the intersection of philosophy with everyday life, and the relevance of ancient wisdom in contemporary society. Dr. Paul Cartledge, a renowned scholar from Cambridge University, shares insights into the philosophical innovations of the ancient Greeks and their enduring legacy in shaping Western thought.


Presocratics and Pythagoras

  • Can we go back to the Presocratics or Milesian philosophers? Are there any ideas or aphorisms that you find to be especially useful to improve our lives?

We can, indeed. At one level, the title is transparent, obvious, and helpful: the earliest of the Presocratics were thinkers, intellectuals, who practiced a version of the Socratic nostrum ‘the unexamined life isn’t worth living for a human being’ avantlalettre, i.e., before the lifetime of Socrates (470–399), although what they chose to examine was not chiefly human behaviour and ethics but natural phenomena, the cosmos. Since it’s generally agreed that Socrates was among the first, if not the first, to qualify for the title ‘philosopher’ properly so called, the anomaly arises that some ‘Presocratics’ were not pre-Socrates but his contemporaries, practicing their intellectual craft or putting forth their ideas during Socrates’ lifetime. However, undoubtedly some of the most interesting and pioneering Presocratics did live and do their thinking well before 470—none more so than Thales of Miletus (in today’s Western Turkey, on the Aegean seaboard), who flourished in the years around 600 BCE.

Later jokes at their expense made them out to be the classic ivory-tower intellectuals: always falling down wells while looking up at the heavens. But actually they were far more than that: their mode of thought represented a huge intellectual leap forward because it postulated that the cosmos and the sublunary world could be accounted for and explained in non-supernatural, non-religious, and above all, non-mythical terms. Hesiod, a poet of central Greece (c. 700), had done the religious bit: accounting for the genealogies of all the divine beings and accounting for how, after the divine, came the human sphere, decisively influenced by the divine, in several stages of decline: from a gold to a silver and then a bronze and, contemporaneously, an iron generation or age. Thales & Co. would have no truck with all that. In order to provide an account (logos) of what they could see before their eyes and experience through their other senses, they postulated a single, underlying causal element—selectively borrowing one (they were monists) of the four known elements—earth, fire, wind, or water. For Thales, it was all water. Not scientists in any sense of that word that we’d want to apply; they were rather physiologists, students of phusis, or the non-human natural world.

Besides Thales and his immediate pupils and followers (Anaximenes and Anaximander, both also of Miletus), three other Presocratics have captured posterity’s imagination. I’ll return to Pythagoras momentarily. The other two have stayed in memory in part because of their memorable utterances or aphorisms. The enigmatic Heraclitus from Ephesus (also on Western Turkey’s Aegean shore) opined or observed: You can’t step into the same river twice. (Some were then inspired to claim you couldn’t do that even once.) In no less philosophical a spirit, channeling Thales, he claimed that ‘everything flows’ or ‘everything is in flux’. Xenophanes, yet another from ancient Ionia (Colophon), has been claimed as the father of natural or naturalistic philosophy, of a decidedly relativistic and ethnographic kind. If lions and horses had hands, he said, so that they could draw pictures of their gods, they’d draw them looking like lions and horses.

In just the same way as the (non-Greek) Thracians (from roughly modern Bulgaria) image their gods and goddesses with red hair and blue eyes—just like themselves. So much likewise, inferred Xenophanes, for the Greeks’ anthropomorphic conception of the divine, which (merely) projects human features and human qualities onto their gods and goddesses. No better than lions or horses, really. Did that make him an atheist? Not necessarily, but he certainly anticipated a very late Presocratic, Protagoras, from Abdera in northern mainland Greece, who, in some of the very few ipsissimaverba of his that have been preserved, asserted that man (the human being as a species) is the measure of all things—of all things that are that they are—and, concerning the nature (rather than the existence) of divine beings, that the subject was obscure and life too short to puzzle it out satisfactorily. Something of a cop-out, perhaps.

  • Pythagoras looms large in Western philosophy but is also mysterious. I recall stories about him being kind to a puppy or releasing fish back into the water. Is this more of a Hindu, Buddhist, or modern mode?

Arguably, there are connections between early Greek philosophy and oriental philosophies, including Buddhism. It’s thought to be not coincidental that the Buddha flourished in the same 6th century BCE as the earliest Presocratics, although direct connections between the Greek world and the Indian subcontinent were not firmly established for another couple of centuries (see below, on Alexander the Great in the East). And there’s a strong case for seeing in some of Pythagoras’s behaviour qualities the mystic or the shaman. What’s undeniable is that this native of the island of Samos emigrated to the Greek West and set himself up in southern Italy, where he attracted disciples rather than pupils, who in turn worshipped him, at least after his death, as a more than merely human being. Most famous for ‘his’ theorem—not in fact his at all; he simply borrowed it—Pythagoras was a profound believer that animals had souls and that it would therefore be wicked and impious to sacrifice and eat them.

Other Greeks, followers of Orpheus, were also vegetarians, but as such, they were a very tiny minority. Allied to his vegetarianism was Pythagoras’ belief in metempsychosis, that is, the transmigration of souls after death, both from one human being to another and from a human being to a non-human being such as a puppy. At the highest intellectual level, beyond that of everyday religion or philosophy, Pythagoras was an ace mathematician, hence ‘his’ theorem. Anticipating Plato, he tried to go beyond the analytical truths of mundane equations and perceive a harmony or music of the spheres, and, further, to push to its limits the explanatory power of number theory. That was very far from releasing captured fish back into the water.

  • Pythagoras began a community that was like a monastery. Is it fair to say that this means that to live a philosophical life, it’s a good idea to spend time in a community or visit one? How do we deal with modern life—the madding crowd?

I think by ‘community’ here you must mean something quite different from the ‘community'—or’ society—about which Aristotle theorized and wrote. Pythagoras’ community I’d prefer to call a ‘’ or indeed a ‘cult’, and a very peculiar (odd) one at that, by anyone’s standards. To take a more normal or normative ancient instance, Aristotle’s ideal-typical ancient Greek community, the polis, was by our modern standards teeny-tiny (often a few hundreds, rarely several thousands of citizens) and, so far as developed countries go, remarkably un-diverse culturally speaking. And yet such is the—what shall we call it?—moderateness, sobriety, and sheer good sense of his ethical recommendations that they still speak to many of us to this day, providing us with genuine life lessons.

  • Robert Oppenheimer has recently been all over the news with the release of his biopic. He loved the Bhagavad Gita and other classics, such as Plato’s Theaetetus. Can you tell us about this dialogue and about Plato?

Plato presented his philosophy through the medium of invented dialogues, tried out first of all on his pupils at his Athens Academy of Higher Learning (founded in the 380s), later published on papyrus as finished works, many of which are also considered masterpieces of prose literature. They exemplify the so-called ‘Socratic’ Q&A method of inquiry, so named because Plato’s mentor Socrates (who never wrote a word) is featured in almost all of his dialogues as the principal interlocutor. It must be emphasized that these dialogues are not transcripts but Platonic creations or fictions. The ‘Socrates’ character is very much Plato’s version of him. Plato lived to a very great age, and the dialogues were published over some three decades; the Theaetetus, named for one of Socrates’ two principal discussants here, is thought to fall towards the end of that period.

Like most of the earliest, this dialogue focuses on a single definitional question, a matter of epistemology: what is knowledge? ‘Theaetetus’ has three goes at trying to define it; none of them satisfies ‘Socrates’. The aporetic (no decisive answer reached) discussion then turns to another, related question: what is it/what counts as ‘to give an account’, to construct a logos (literally ‘word’, by extension speech, reasoning, account) of any complex concept? All three explanations or justifications offered are deemed to fail, leading once again to aporia (literally no way forward or through, though discovering that to be the case a reading of can of course be a positive gain). Plato’s Theaetetus was, in real life, a brilliant mathematician. Presumably what Oppy, a super-brilliant physicist, found appealing about the dialogue were the processes involved in ground-level philosophizing about foundational concepts such as knowledge and giving an account.

  • So, is it fair to say that these great philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, offered self-help—that is, that they were therapeutic?

Much of Plato’s philosophy had to do with individual ethics, right and wrong, justice and injustice, and goodness, which for him required an ultra-high level of intellectual capacity. His most famous pupil, Aristotle, cast his intellectual net far wider, though he too wrote memorably on ethics, especially on the ethics of friendship, but for him, the social-political context of behavior mattered as much as did personal probity (see further below).But the two most influential ancient Greek philosophical systems that majored in therapy for the soul were Stoicism and Epicureanism. They were both founded in Aristotle’s lifetime, in the second half of the 4th century BCE, respectively, by Zeno, a mixed-ethnic Greek from Cyprus, and Epicurus, born of Athenian parentage on the island of Samos.

  • I’d like to return to the theme of community. Most of us are worried about this today—that we are losing community and even friends. Individuals, families, societies—everything is changing, and people are on the go. Can the Greeks help us here?

One particular Greek may be particularly able to help us here, though with one rather huge preliminary proviso: the ancient Greek community (society, polity) was not ours; the Greeks did things very differently from us: they held slaves, on whom they depended, and did so mostly without any moral qualms whatsoever; they conceived and treated adult women, even if legally free persons, as of at best second-class status; and they, most of them, regarded all non-Greeks as by definition in principle inferior—culturally. That said, the virtue-ethical system of Aristotle is still considered by many experts today to have current pragmatic as well as theoretical value. Three Aristotelian treatises of ethical, or rather moral-political, philosophy have survived, of which the Nicomachean Ethics is overall by far the most superior work.

For Aristotle, community—living the good life within a totalizing societal framework—was all in all. What the Greeks called a polis—whence our ‘politics’, 'polity', etc.—was far more than merely a constitutional, political framework of self-governance. Rather, it was the framework—and the only possible framework—within which human beings could most and best flourish, that is, live the truly good life, as that was defined by Aristotle. It is far too often said that Aristotle coined the phrase ‘political animals’. What he actually did was define human beings as living creatures designed by their nature to realise their full potential within and only within the polis framework. Being socially conventional, he thought that that definition applied more particularly to the males of the species, especially adult free politically enfranchised Greek males, and did not apply at all to human persons whom he designated naturally ‘slav’, that is, lacking unalterably from birth the capacity of logical reasoning. Aristotle’s eudaimonia is often under-translated as ‘happiness’ but better interpreted as faring well, that is, living a life wholly in accordance with the virtue-ethics set out in the first seven ‘books’, all premised on two notions, one epistemological and the other pragmatic.

On the other hand, particular philosophers did indeed establish ‘communities’ of their followers, and although their schools were located in public, often religious spaces, and some (oral and written) lessons were made available to a wide public, it clearly was crucial for there to be a small, even intimate circle of pupils around each individual master for their philosophies to be developed before being more widely disseminated. Is any of that helpful for us trying to cope with the madnesses of modern life—AI, social media, bonkers political parties, insane dictators, the threat of nuclear or environmental extinction?? That’s anyone’s guess.

  • Does this call for moderation, the golden mean?

Pragmatically, one should always aim at moderation, at a middle ground between excesses. For instance, it might be right, ok, understandable, or forgivable to be angry in a specific set of circumstances, but one should never be too angry, not angry enough, or angry for the wrong reason and/or with the wrong person(s) and in the wrong circumstances. The case of Homer’s Achilles springs to mind: he was far too angry, with immediately disastrous consequences for the Greek host at Troy. See further below on Aristotle’s ‘happiness’.

  • I think that most people consider happiness to be a feeling, but Aristotle had something else in mind.

Yes, when we’re feeling especially happy, we might even speak of being in a state of euphoria (literally, well-bearing). And you’re right too that, though feelings or emotions do come into Aristotle’s virtue ethics (e.g., anger; see above), being happy for him meant rather attaining a permanent state than experiencing some temporary emotion. In short, being virtuous for Aristotle was essentially a matter of habituation: habituating one’s soul (including mind as well as spirit) to choose the right amount of feeling or emotion in the right situation towards the right person or person, right being the mean between two extremes of emotion or feeling, taking account of one’s own natural propensities—e.g., some are far more easily, more ‘naturally’, roused to anger than others. Their mean will be more emotionally angry than that of less naturally angry persons.

  • Is the word Arete related to your answer? I also recall that Martin Seligman, one of the founders of positive psychology, emphasized the word eudaimonia?

The ancient Greek word that we translate as ‘virtue’ (derived from Latin) is indeed aretê. The four ‘cardinal’ virtues are (roughly) wisdom, prudence (practical wisdom), temperance (self-control), and bravery (courage). Plato, as we’ve seen, privileged the first, Aristotle the second. Both saw a need for the third. But the fourth—bravery or courage—was far more problematic. For a start, the very Greek word for the virtue of bravery or courage was gendered (as indeed is Latin virtus): andreia literally meant ‘manliness’ or ‘masculinity’. Aristotle was therefore typical in believing either or both that women couldn’t be brave at all or that, if considered so, their bravery was of a different, inferior kind from men’s. Calling a woman ‘brave’ in Greek—Clytemnestra, Artemisia of Halicarnassus were so called—was both very rare and somewhat disturbing to a male ear. But both Plato and Aristotle were unusual in questioning at least some aspects of the one application of bravery or courage that all Greeks and all Greek communities practiced, often willy-nilly: war. For example, Aristotle queried the value of a heavily militarized Spartan education that, though it produced above-average warriors, rendered the Spartans in some respects little more than wild beasts.

  • What about those “dogs” or cynics? Can they help us on our quest?

The ancient Greeks were ambivalent about their feelings about dogs. In their foundational works of literature, the two Homeric epics could be found both extreme affection (of Odysseus for his hunting dog Argos) and the derogatory epithet ‘dog-like’. In Greek reality, a Greek princess could be named ‘Puppy’ (Cynisca of Sparta), and a Greek could choose to be buried with his favourite canine pet, yet dogs could also be used as metaphors for conduct deemed utterly inappropriate for civilized human beings, such as copulating and defecating in public. It was in the latter, negative sense, that followers of Diogenes, originally from Sinope on the southern shore of the Black Sea, acquired the label ''Cynics'—doglike.

But for the collective label to have some positive content, adepts had to agree and act on at least some philosophically defensible tenets or principles. One, roughly and crudely put, was ‘back to nature’: playing on a by then (4th century BCE) hackneyed philosophical debate over the merits and demerits of following nature as opposed to culture or convention, Cynics went all out for un-conventional, even anti-social behaviours. The agreed founder, Diogenes (see further next answer below), took his particular antinomianism as far as regularly masturbating in public. Others privileged a disdain for all material goods and practiced various versions of asceticism, literally ‘practised’, since ‘practice’ is exactly what ancient Greek askêsis meant. It wasn’t just a soft lifestyle option, as Epicureanism could be all too easily misconstrued and misrepresented by non-adepts or opponents.

  • Did Diogenes really live in a barrel?

Different versions were given in antiquity. The one I like best was set in Corinth, the headquarters of the Greek anti-Persian alliance that Alexander had inherited from his (assassinated) father Philip II of Macedon. Diogenes was living 'rough' in his home, a large terracotta pot called a pithos. Alexander, an admirer, inquired of Diogenes whether he could be of service to him. Yes, replied the Cynic sage – you’re blocking the sunlight, so move away. Despite such a rebuff, Alexander is said to have commented that, if he could be anything other than Alexander, he’d want to be Diogenes. Believe that…

In 326, having won a great battle at the River Hydaspes (modern Jhelum), but then having had to face down a mutiny, Alexander the Great decided to march his victorious and mutinous troops down the Indus valley towards the river’s mouth before returning west to Iran and eventually Iraq (where he died at Babylon in 323 BCE). Accounts differ: Alexander, a former pupil of Aristotle, either encountered in person Indian philosophers called by the Greeks ‘Gymnosophists’ (literally, stark naked wise men) or he sent off one of his leading commanders, himself a Cynic, to meet with similar Gymnosophists further south. Developed, or embroidered, versions of these encounters, real or alleged, include the classic trope of Greeks posing to Indian ‘barbarians’ questions designed to reveal their ignorance but receiving answers that, on the contrary, demonstrated the latter’s sophisticated wit and wisdom.

Huston Smith, Plotinus and the Ideal of Beauty

  • Years ago, Huston Smith, the author of The World’s Religion, quoted Plotinus: Those that contemplate beauty become beautiful. Can you delve into that?

I can delve, yes, but taking a deep dive is more difficult. Plotinus was an Egyptian Greek (CE 205-270), Alexandrian-educated, and a follower of Plato’s philosophy to such a degree of identification as to be labelled a Neoplatonist. His collected writings, edited by a student, consist of six Enneads, an Ennead being a grouping of nine endogenous Egyptian divinities. Within those writings, at Enneads 1.6 and 5.8.1-2, beauty and ideas of beauty are given centre stage, to the philosophical point even of there being a question whether Plotinus identified the ultimate goal of a good life, ‘the One’, with beauty itself. Regardless, Plotinus starts by drawing a distinction between beauty that is physical and visible, a matter of (mere) appearance, and beauty that is inner, spiritual, and therefore superior—very Platonic. Your Plotinus quotation has it that contemplaters of beauty become beautiful themselves; if by that is meant something like Plotinus’s notion that becoming beautiful is fully identifying ourselves with the beauty within us, then Huston Smith was quoting more or less accurately. But these are deep waters—too deep, I freely admit—to swim in comfortably or enjoyably.

  • What does it all mean? Does philosophy answer things definitively?

What you seem to be asking, or rather presupposing an answer to, is (nothing less than):What’s it all about? What’s the meaning of life? For the ancient Greeks—or rather, I should say for some ancient Greek philosophers—there was no distinction, let alone contradiction, between what Latin-speakers came to call the vita activa and the vita contemplativa. To be virtuous, for Aristotle, my go-to exemplar, it wasn’t enough to be good in the sense of having good psychic habits and dispositions; it was necessary to do good in acts and actions. To be pragmatically and not just in principle virtuous demanded the application of energeia, translating thoughts, desires, and wishes into erga, practical deeds that might have lasting effects.

Materialism—how one should behave virtuously in regard to the possession and use of material goods—is just one relevant conditioning variable. It preoccupied everyone, especially Aristotle, his followers, and the various Stoics. But inner peace was the concern, rather, of the Epicureans. My answer to your question—really, a non-answer—is that a selective reading of varieties of ancient Greek philosophy can suggest how we might go about thinking about how to reconcile those modes, but that there is no Golden Rule already laid down somewhere in those extant writings that we may simply take down off the shelf, dust it off, and apply it in our daily lives.

  • The value of philosophy and the other humanities is immense. But STEM, the vast entertainment culture, the need for practical employment, etc. create vast challenges.

A former university vice chancellor of my acquaintance, a leading immunologist, once said to me that, in his view, a university in which the sciences were considered omnipotent and omnicompetent and the arts and humanities subjects were therefore discredited and derogated was not properly speaking a university at all. Of course, the positive arguments in favour of studying STEM subjects are often unanswerable, both theoretically and pragmatically, both individually and societally. But is that a good or sufficient reason for derogating the arts and humanities subjects, whether at secondary or tertiary levels of education? Of course, as a professor of ancient (Greek and Roman, classical) history, I would say ‘no’, wouldn’t I?

It’s much harder to set out and defend or advocate for persuasively in a very brief compass such as this and the many reasons why. I suppose ultimately I’d go back to that Socratic aphorism about the unexamined life that I discussed earlier and mention it again in my next and final answer. But here I’d want to put it in a slightly different way, appealing to the ancient Greek words for a (legal-sense) ‘judge’ and ‘judgement’. The latter, krisis, when transliterated as 'crisis', usually means something quite other than its original Greek sense or senses, which denoted and connoted a process of judgement or moment of decision, relying on factually accurate evidence, rational argument, poised self-awareness, and other such mental and ethical qualities. One of my many reasons for being glad that all those decades ago I decided to devote my professional life to the study of the ancient Greeks’ civilization and culture is that they—some of them—subjected even their most fundamental institutions and beliefs to the most critical scrutiny imaginable.

Concluding Thoughts

  • Time rolls by, and philosophy is an endless topic, game, and path. It feels like we just got started on the subject. Can you finish with any idea, person, aphorism, or practice that we missed?

You're, of course, right, but as someone once said somewhere, the beginning is half of the whole. My favourite ancient Greek philosophical aphorism is one I’ve already quoted, as attributed by Plato to Socrates. The original context is not irrelevant or unimportant; it’s from Socrates’ supposed apologia (defense speech) when on trial for his life in 399 for the capital crimes of impiety and treason. ‘The unexamined life is not worth living for a human being’. The last four English words, often omitted, are just one word in the original Greek: Socrates’ point, I believe, was that to be truly human, one must examine one’s way of life, something that only humans can properly do. The word translated as ‘examine’ meant examine forensically, as if metaphorically (as Socrates really in fact was) one was on trial for one’s life.

Socrates, as a citizen of the Athenian democracy, had, I believe, serious flaws, but as a champion of free thought and expression, he was and is a hero of the inner, the intellectual, life.

Tags Richard Marranca
Featured
image_2025-06-25_003912398.png
Jun 24, 2025
How the Neanderthals Disappeared: A New and Controversial Theory
Jun 24, 2025
Read More →
Jun 24, 2025
image_2025-06-25_003634219.png
Jun 24, 2025
Ancient Stone Tools from South African Cave Reveal Life at the Edge of the Ice Age
Jun 24, 2025
Read More →
Jun 24, 2025
image_2025-06-25_003525105.png
Jun 24, 2025
Peru Gas Workers Uncover 1,000-Year-Old Mummy in Lima
Jun 24, 2025
Read More →
Jun 24, 2025
image_2025-06-25_003118764.png
Jun 24, 2025
Ancient Tel Dan Sanctuary Sheds New Light on Phoenician Ritual Bathing Traditions
Jun 24, 2025
Read More →
Jun 24, 2025
image_2025-06-25_002547028.png
Jun 24, 2025
Ice Age Shelter High in Australia’s Blue Mountains Reveals 20,000 Years of Aboriginal Heritage
Jun 24, 2025
Read More →
Jun 24, 2025
image_2025-06-25_001137010.png
Jun 24, 2025
Unique Ancient Lotus-Shaped Stone Pool Complex Unearthed in Astara, Azerbaijan
Jun 24, 2025
Read More →
Jun 24, 2025
read more

Powered by The archaeologist